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exclusionary practices by their more powerful rivals. In contrast, conservatives, while rarely openly denying the need for antitrust laws in principle, have tended, except in instances of outright collusive price-fixing or market-sharing, to side with the defendants, decrying prosecutions of companies for engaging in unfair methods of competition as confusing the legitimate goal of preserving the competitive process with protecting competitors from deserved extinction.
Increasingly sensitive to the imperfections of real world product, capital and labor markets, 19th and 20th century liberals, more and more in association with "institutionalist" skeptics of the "folklore of capitalism" and socialists, crypto-and overt-fought with increasing success for consumer protections such as pure food and drug and, later, consumer product safety and investor-protection laws, prohibitions of misleading advertising, comprehensive regulation of public utilities, conceived to be "naturally monopolistic", and labor-protective and social security legislation, such as unemployment insurance, child labor, worker's compensation, workplace safety, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, and protection of the right of workers to bargain collectively. While most of those interventions may be conceived or rationalized as efforts merely to supplement or improve the functioning of essentially unregulated markets, others-supported, notably, by the industries themselves, as well as by above-mentioned "free-market" skeptics, curbed competition as "unethical" or "destructive", as indeed it sometimes was.
The remedy was often to subject practitioners to mandatory licensure, assertedly to ensure their competence, and imposing on them the obligation to serve all comers, without "undue" discrimination-an issue of enormous importance today in the form of legislative proposals to require Internet service providers to practice "network neutrality" (see Part IV, below), but also having the-often intentional-effect of restricting their number and prescribing higher-than-competitive prices. In a series of epochal decisions over a half-century, the U.S.
Supreme Courts struggled successively to decide whether this or that industry-grain elevators, employment and insurance agencies, theatre ticket brokers, local ice companies-was sufficiently "clothed with a public interest" to justify such regulation. Along the way, in 1922, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, attempted a summary of the precedents to date (1923) :
Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some public regulation may be divided into three classes:
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived .... Such are those of the keepers of inns, cabs, and grist mills....
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to some government regulation .... In the language of the cases, the owner by devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest. ...
It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator, or the miner was clothed with such a public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by State regulation....
An ordinary producer, manufacturer or shopkeeper may sell or not sell as he likes....
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Ultimately prevailing, however-insofar as the constitutionality of such legislative interventions was concerned-was the view enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in one of his classic dissents:
The notion that a business is clothed with the public interest and has been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535-537 (1923) . 2 Dissenting opinion in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) , and by Chief Justice Stone, likewise dissenting: "The phrase 'business affected with a public interest' seems to me to be too vague and illusory to carry us very far on the way to a solution. It tends in use to become only a convenient expression for describing those businesses, regulation of which has been permitted in the past. To say that only those businesses affected with a public interest may be regulated is but another way of stating that all those businesses which may be regulated are affected with a public interest." Ibid., p. 451.
And by his unequivocally liberal junior partner in dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis:
The notion of a distinct category of business 'affected with a public interest,' employing property 'devoted to a public use,' rests upon historical error. . . . In my opinion, the true principle is that the State's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the public protection.
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Sensitive also to increasing inequality in the distribution of income and opportunity, 19 th and 20 th century liberals have supported free public education and progressive income and inheritance taxation. In this they have been joined by conscientious conservatives: John Stuart
Mill, apostle of classical economic liberalism, endorsed what the Bush Administration has been pleased to call the "death tax," as a means of promoting the equality of opportunity that a free market economy was intended to offer, and that de Tocqueville praised as contributing to America's "meritocracy", and Clinton Rossiter-the eloquent expositor of a 20 th century version of Conservatism in America to which 20 th century liberals could also readily subscribeidentified as its final "shift in approach or emphasis": it has given some ground under the pressures of the age of anxiety and now admits that government can act positively in defense and elaboration of 'the greatest of all rights-the right to equal opportunity.'
4
While radicals have frequently supported these liberal reforms, they have tended to regard them as superficial, at best palliatives, at worst "opiates for the masses"-delaying the 3 Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 301-303 (1932). 4 Conservatism in America, 2 nd edition, revised, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982, pages 186-187. The New York Times' token but authentic conservative columnist, David Brooks, berated the Republican Presidential candidates for the fact that, in their economic debate in Michigan, there was almost nothing that touched concretely on the lives of the ambitious working-class parents who are the backbone of the G.O.P.
Sometimes the candidates seemed more concerned with massaging the pleasure buttons of the Club for Growth than addressing the real concerns of the middle class. They talked far more about cutting corporate taxes, for example, than about a child tax credit for struggling families, [leaving to be] "seized by a Democrat [Hillary Clinton] programs aimed directly at members of the aspiring middle class Yesterday, it was a tax credit for college …. The way our tax code is structured, people up the income ladder get big tax incentives to save, while working people, who have the most trouble saving, get the smallest incentives. 
Statutory cartelization: the effect of the Great Depression of the 1930s
The apparent victories of the latter-day liberals continued in spurts throughout the 20 th century, from Theodore Roosevelt's successes in conservation and-almost certainly Some of the "reforms" were less progressive than their proponents thought. Regulation of the railroads, it became increasingly clear, was promoted as much by the railroads themselves, to suppress competition among them, as by farmers captive to a single transporter of their crops.
Similarly, the telephone and electric companies accepted-indeed, promoted-cost-plus regulation by state public utility commissions-often manned by pliable failed politicians-as a small price to pay for the franchises that gave them legal protection from competition. by industry, by business and labor leaders-often (or typically) employing the trade association structure of the 1920's-setting prices and imposing output quotas, company by company, in the erroneous belief that since competition had intensified the vicious downward wage/price spiral, the remedy was to suppress it. President Reagan was not confusing a movie plot with historical reality in this case when he likened those "reforms" to the syndicalization of industry in Fascist
Italy and Nazi Germany.
Partial resurrection of liberalism in the later New Deal
After the Supreme Court declared the N.R. A. unconstitutional, in 1935 , the New Deal turned back to authentic liberalism in two important ways that remain thoroughly valid today. 
Agricultural subsidization and protectionism
One area in which the two sides ought nevertheless to be able to agree would be our deplorable longstanding restrictions on imports and subsidized exports of agricultural commodities. One example of especial poignancy today is our egregious quota restrictions on imports of sugar, which have held domestic prices far above world levels 10 , to the benefit of one percent of the total farm population, many of them corporations and most of them with other good uses for their land.
That deplorable program has taken on a wholly new dimension in recent years, as our dependence on foreign oil has grown, and with it the cost of subsidizing the energy-inefficient substitution of domestically produced ethanol from corn. It is now common understanding that ethanol from sugar-that is, foreign sugar-would be far more economical and energy-efficient.
We should not have been surprised, upon realization of that fact, to discover that some not very 
Balance of trade deficits
At least one contention of the latter-day protectionists, implying that we are in a better position to play that game-more effectively and with more justification-than our trading partners because we buy more goods and services from them than they buy from us, is ignorant:
I recently heard the host of my local "progressive" radio talk show declare, in a tone that would brook no contradiction (or, characteristically, telephoned interruption-have any of you listened to their smug cacklings?) that our huge, ominous balance of payments deficits have been caused by the modestly liberalizing trade agreements negotiated in the last two decades. The assertion is flatly wrong: the trade deficits have been the simple reflection of our total national spending exceeding our domestic income and production, the difference necessarily financed by increases stupid 54 cent tariff on imported ethanol or the 51 cent subsidy for ethanol produced domestically from corn.
Foreigners are taking over American property and companies because we have been fighting a war in Iraq, financing it by government borrowing, because we have cut taxes on the wealthy, making it possible for them to build palaces in which to live.
And the fact that we buy more goods and services from foreigners than we sell to them carries no implication whatever that we could better sustain a war of import restrictions than their trading partners.
Labor protective conditions
There is one argument of the protectionists, however, that a conscientious liberal has to take seriously, all the while recognizing that it is typically a pretext for protectionism. A century or so ago we supported laws limiting child labor, prescribing minimum wages and conditions in the workplace, and protecting the right of workers to bargain collectively-even though they tended to shelter labor in our wealthier states from competition from the less advanced. Passage of national-as distinguished from state or local-environmental protection laws has had the same, altogether legitimate, consequence. It is difficult therefore to disagree in principle with the efforts of self-proclaimed progressives to attach such conditions to our imports from low-income countries, even though their motives are protectionist. The conscientious liberal must, however, insist on an equal sensitivity on our part to the fact that the attachment of such conditions to our purchases from low-income countries can deny their workers opportunities to improve their 
Quotas on Japanese cars
Though not a fundamental cause of the economy-wide inflations of the 1970s, the behavior of our oligopolistic, strongly unionized automobile and steel industries, with their own private wage/price spirals and each with its own particular technological and competitive backwardness, aggravated nationwide stagflation. Unsurprisingly, both successfully exerted powerful political pressure to stem the flow of imports that was a competitive economy's retribution for their failures.
The automobile industry posed a particularly poignant dilemma for liberals. Battered by the inflow of German and Japanese cars that was the richly deserved competitive retribution for its poor record of durability, fuel economy and costly, frequent superficial changing of models, it mounted an intense campaign in the late '70s for the imposition of import quotas. By liberal standards, however, the UAW was a "good," progressive industrial union; and the industry was an Equal Rights employer, providing good jobs to comparatively unskilled minority workers emigrating from Southern farms. Still it was shocking to discover that their demand for quotas was supported by the Consumer (sic) Federation of America.
I do not recall President Carter ever receiving the acknowledgement he deserved for his courage in resisting those pressures. Confronted with evidence that the Japanese and German cars averaged slightly more than one major repair in their first year of operation, while the most popular American cars fell in the three-to four-times-a-year range, the President refused to support the demand for quotas, even though he was well aware of how badly he needed the support of the UAW in the impending Presidential primary and election campaigns. For the record, it was the subsequent Reagan Administration, under pressure from a compliant Congress, that capitulated and imposed the quotas. The effort of liberals to avoid that outcome-while remembering also the distortions produced by President Nixon's mandatory wage and price controls-by pursuing the path of essentially voluntary restraints, produced yet another dilemma-no doubt amusing to some Olympian observer. It was epitomized by an uneasy meeting that I had with Frank Fitzsimmons, the powerful boss of the Teamster's Union, in which, speaking on behalf of a President he probably held in contempt, I tried to persuade him to comply with our wage guidelines-fully recognizing that the only effective recompense I could offer was the one neither the President nor I was willing to consider: a promise to relent in our efforts to deregulate trucking. In that sense, we clearly had the last laugh-at the predictable price, however, of having eventually to leave the control of inflation to Chairman Volcker.
III. Domestic Policy
That last historical experience itself reflected another evolution of the liberal tradition.
The Progressive movement was agrarian in its origins-following the Granger, Greenback and Leading non-governmental members of the coalition were The Consumer Federation of America, Common Cause, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen-remember those organizations, in preparation for a "progressive" sequel-Southwest Airlines (which was eager to be permitted to bring its low-cost low-fare style of operation to the interstate arena) and the National Association of Manufacturers, presumably representing the interests of business travelers. These groups were abetted, in the case of trucking, by the National Federation of Small Businesses, some very large industrial and mercantile shippers, and farm organizations, the last of these chafing at restrictive Despite the breadth of these coalitions, the left-wingers among the liberals-a prominent example of whom was the aforementioned Professor Galbraith-were never enthusiastic about the deregulations-just as they have been prone to underestimate the effectiveness of competition in the economy generally. Afterwards, in coalition with the airline unions, some of the most ardent consumer organizations originally supportive of deregulation in the '70s decided it had all been a mistake:
"Deregulation was supposed to cut prices, expand choice, enhance serviceimprove your life. So how come you're not smiling?"
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A decade or so after deregulation, the Economic Policy Institute, evidently supported by organized labor, hired a law professor, Paul Dempsey, another long-time opponent, to point out triumphantly that while average fares had declined very satisfactorily in real terms after deregulation, they had declined no more rapidly than during the corresponding preceding period-conveniently overlooking the fact that, as I had myself suggested twenty years previously, the explanation in the earlier period was the deus ex machina of the jet revolution, whereas in the later period it was the furious competitive discounting made possible by the change in the law. And the economist and co-founder of the Institute, Robert Kuttner, began his complaint about deregulation, " he committed the same offense some eighteen and a half years later:
It costs me more to fly to Washington, D.C., than to Washington State, even though it's less than one-sixth the distance.
23
And once again, The Nation's William Greider, characteristically permitting ideology to determine the facts:
"The deregulated system raised costs for the least affluent, while larger business customers were able to bargain for lower prices."
24
No one who has looked at the facts of the last 25 years can fail to see that, on the contrary, the most dramatic and immediate effect of airline deregulation was the explosion of discounting, cutting average fares by about one-half, inflation adjusted, and bringing air travel at once within the reach of people of modest incomes. While large businesses also were enabled to bargain for bulk discounts, the most bitter complainers about the new fare structures were in fact the business travelers who, finding it inconvenient to qualify for the discounts-two weeks advance purchase, mandatory stay over the weekend and the like-had to pay something much closer to full fare. The significant economic fact is that those discount fares, employed almost at once by the overwhelming majority of travelers, made possible, and, correspondingly, were made possible by the increase in the average percentage of seats sold-load factors-from the low 50s The opposition of the American teamsters is of course unsurprising. Although not surprised, I
found myself nevertheless outraged to read of the support of that protectionism by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, assertedly representing the "public interest."
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To be sure, the 25-to 30-point increase in airline load factors has meant increased crowding and discomfort, the intensity of which I have no intention to minimize. But it was precisely the failure of the industry under regulation to provide travelers of modest means with a choice of economy over comfort that constituted both the need for deregulation and the essence of its success. The airline experience wonderfully illustrates the principle that cartelization of a structurally competitive industry-in particular, the prohibition of price competition-sets off all sorts of other forms of competition, substantive and non-substantive-the fatal flaw of which is that it denies customers the choice of low-priced service free of those amenities.
26

Bumping rules for airlines
One such specific choice, for the offer of which I claim some credit, was the bumping rule that I persuaded the Civil Aeronautics Board to adopt shortly after assuming the Chairmanship. As to the conception, I happily acknowledge the priority of the late Julian Simon, who had struggled in vain for many years to convince the airlines and the Board to install such a scheme-and sent me a bouquet of roses the day I fulfilled his mission-and that of other The airline experience clearly illustrates the principle that in an industry with a number of competitors, actual and/or potential, suppressions of price competition set off wasteful competition instead in quality of service, real and imaginary. In a compromise between economy of effort and modesty, here is how I expressed the principle, first generally, in 1981:
If price is prevented from falling to marginal cost … then, to the extent that competition prevails, it will tend to raise cost to the level of price.
The Economics of Regulation, reprinted, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1988, Volume 2, p. 209.
Then, more specifically, to an international aviation audience:
The typical answer of foreign governments to asserted excessively low load factors, namely the imposition of direct limitations on the amount of capacity offered, market by market, provides yet another illustration of the inexorable tendency for regulation of a competitive industry to spread. Control price, and the result will be an artificial stimulus to entry. Control entry as well, and the result will be an artificial stimulus to compete by offering larger commissions to travel agents, advertising, denser scheduling, free meals, and bigger seats. The response of the complete regulator, then, is to limit advertising, control scheduling and travel agents' commissions, specify the size of the sandwiches and seats and the charge for in-flight movies. Each time the dike springs a leak, plug it with one of your fingers; just as a dynamic industry will perpetually find ways of opening new holes in the dike, so an ingenious regulator will never run out of regulatory fingers.
The economically efficient way of deciding how much higher-cost service should be provided is to give customers a choice between it and lower price/quality combinations. … And price competition does so much more. It puts severe pressure on managements, which regulation can never duplicate, to improve the efficiency with which they operate, and to hold down the prices they pay for labor and other inputs. And, in contrast with capacity controls, it provides the maximum assurance that the cost savings will, in fact, be passed on to the traveling and shipping public.
Presentation before a symposium, "The Changing Environment of International Air Commerce," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1978; reproduced in Air Law (Netherlands), Volume 3, No. 3, 1978. selected to surrender it in the event the number of travelers with confirmed reservations turning up for a flight exceeded the capacity of the aircraft.
At the first opportunity, I proposed the simple resolution of what I pointed out was an economic rather than an ethical or moral problem: it seems to me the April 25 staff memo before me fails to focus clearly on the significance of the central point I heard Judge [Lee] West make at the last Board meeting on this subject: namely, that the cost of a denial of boarding will vary enormously depending on the circumstances of the particular traveler who is bumped.
This suggests to me that the essential job before us is to see to it that the ones who are bumped are the ones whose pain is least, relative to the compensation they receive. Indeed, the ideal result would be one in which all non-boardings in the event of overbooking are voluntary, i.e., the "bumpees" get off, or don't get on, because the compensation is sufficient to make it worthwhile. If we could achieve that end, there would be no objections to boarding denials-a result certainly worth a dedicated effort to achieve. 27 And, then, at the next opportunity:
I'd like to suggest the following possible plan for dealing with the overbooking problem.
That the Board issue a proposed rulemaking, the central feature of which would be a declaration of intention to prohibit all involuntary bumping. (If you read my memo of June 22 on this subject, you will recognize that this is not necessarily a prohibition of overbooking, but requires only that the people who are bumped from flights be self-selecting, because they are satisfied with the proffered compensation.) 28 -from which followed the common-perhaps universal-practice of airlines offering compensation in the form of free flights on some other occasion, sufficient to elicit the requisite number of volunteers to surrender their seats on the flight that turned out to have been overoverbooked.
Some Board members and "progressive" consumer advocates-such as (once again!) Ralph Nader's Aviation Consumer Action Project, whose leader had, in a notorious incident, been the victim of one such denial of boarding-contended that deliberate overbooking was 27 Memorandum to Board Members: "Overbooking", June 22, 1977. 28 Memorandum to Board Members: "Overbooking, a Specific Proposal", July 20, 1977. immoral and our solution equally so because it would be the poorer people who would typically give up their seats; and that the regular airline practice of overbooking, in recognition of the probability that not all holders of reservations would typically claim their seats, should be subject to severe penalties when-inevitably, under the laws of probability-it resulted in carriers overestimating the number of no-shows and being forced in consequence to deny some passengers their right to a seat. What I succeeded in persuading my colleagues-none of them, of course, economists, until I was joined, happily, by Elizabeth Bailey-was that the practice itself had nothing to do with morality, but was efficient: that permitting planes to fly out with empty seats was pure waste; and that overbooking in order to minimize the likelihood of that eventuality would be economically efficient so long as the benefit to the carrier could be made to exceed the cost-the inconvenience to travelers volunteering to surrender their reserved seats on those occasions when the overbooking turned out to have been excessive. The obvious solution, which we adopted, was the rule that on those occasions in which the number of travelers with reservations appearing at the ticket counter exceeded the number of available seats, the airline would be required to offer all its passengers the option of compensation-typically, as it turned out, a future free round-trip ticket anywhere on the carrier's domestic system-sufficient to induce the required number of them to surrender their seats voluntarily. From the standpoint of both the carrier and society at large, the practice would be efficient so long as the net additional revenues of the carrier attributable to its overbookings exceeded the compensation required to induce the requisite number of volunteers to surrender their seats when necessary. Conversely, so long as the compensation offered was sufficient to elicit the requisite number of volunteers and, on the other hand, less than the net additional revenue from filling seats that would otherwise go out empty, no party would be a loser, neither the airline nor the volunteers. If the costs of the necessary bribes, instead, turned out to exceed the additional net revenue earned by its overbooking, it would be the carrier itself that would bear the cost of its mistake-a healthy discipline against over-over-overbooking. And, most important, such a rule should have appeased-although it did not, universally-the "consumer advocates" who objected that the burden of denied boarding would under this arrangement always fall on the "poor": no party, rich or poor, would give up his seat so long as the anticipated inconvenience of having to wait for the next flight exceeded the value of the compensation; and while, conversely, it would indeed typically be the less affluent who would accept such bribes, they would still do so only voluntarily-that is only if, as a result of doing so, they would come out winners. A perfect example of a no-loss no-loser arrangement.
Congestion and congestion pricing
Since I freely admit-indeed, proudly claim-some responsibility for the increased crowding and discomfort and, in particular, the increased congestion in the skies and on the ground and consequent delays (the worst in the first half 2007 since the DOT began keeping track in 1995 29 )-even far beyond the ones that the airlines have already implicitly acknowledged by increasing their scheduled flight and arrival times-I feel entitled to point out that they were easily foreseeable and the preventive identified and urgently advocated-by me early in the deregulation process 30 and, before that and before he became my cohort in proposal easily predicted-by me-twenty-nine years previously:
As I read through the list of topics and questions that were given to me by FAA as possible items to discuss, they all really seem to come down to one question, "Can you people at the CAB do more than you are doing to reduce those demands that you are placing upon us and the pressures that they are creating?"…. The first part is no; I am not interested in helping you directly. I am not interested in … controlling airline scheduling…. [or] authorizing the carriers to get together and collaboratively regulate their schedules or otherwise limit the capacity that they offer and, therefore, the pressures that they impose on airport [and air traffic control] facilities….
I am not interested in cooperating in any way in imposing hourly quotas and airport slotting. These are all forms of direct rationing, and everybody here knows that direct rationing is extremely inefficient….
[A]t a time when we at the CAB are trying to restore economic rationality to this industry … to place increasing reliance on the competitive market … to decide how much airline service should be provided and where; at a time when we at the CAB are doing our best to lift the heavy burden of pervasive, direct, arbitrary, artificial bureaucratic interventions, we are not about to set about enthusiastically to intensify precisely those same kinds of arbitrary controls in order to solve the problem of limited airport [and air] space inefficiently….
There is no guarantee that freer competition on the airline side of the equation-that is the part that creates the demand for airports [and air traffic control]-alone will solve these problems. On the contrary, it will stimulate more air travel….
The allocation of scarce airport [and air] space is an economic problem just like any other economic problem, and the decision about whether to incur the cost of additional capacity or the cost of expensive R&D or what kinds of R&D to develop new technologies … is an economic problem. And it will never be made intelligently until the users who are responsible for the incurrence of those costs … pay the full cost reckoned on a marginal or replacement basis…. It would also encourage the use of big planes if you had the proper charging because their cost per passenger would be lower than the cost of small planes if they happened to coincide with the system peak.
[M]y moral is simply this to the FAA: If you are going to follow economically irrational policies, don't ask the CAB to bail you out by doing the same thing: As the gang in West Side Story said at the end: "Officer Krupke, we've got problems of our own." If, however, you are willing to be thinking about using economically rational policies, then we would be very happy to cooperate. The only possible-and sufficient-solution is to entrust air traffic control to a separate, corporate entity, independent of Congress, empowered to raise the capital it needs to adopt the most modern technology-apparently employing global positioning-financing the investment with user fees reflecting marginal costs and, above all, independent of the Congressional budget process.
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Airline passenger "Bills of Rights"
The enormous increase in flying spurred by deregulation, the increased crowding and congestion on planes, in the airways and on the ground, and the intensified pressures on carriers to cut costs-these instruments and manifestations of the successes of deregulation-have also, understandably, been the occasion also for mounting complaints by travelers generally about mistreatments, both real and imagined. Liberals and latter-day Progressives alike would recognize the need for governmental protection of consumers against deceptive or otherwise unfair treatment, inviting complaints of specific asserted mistreatments and empowered to provide redress-as, most recently, in New York State's "Airline Passenger Rights" legislation, effective January 1, 2008, entrusting this responsibility to the State Consumer Protection Board.
Statement of this unexceptionable principle provides little substantive guidance for the resolution of the most familiar complaints, about losses of baggage and cancellations of flights, the latter because of weather, asserted mechanical problems or shortages of crew. There is an entire jurisprudence to be developed here, involving the optimal distribution of risk or cost between carriers and travelers-subject also of course to the demands of safety.
(My first inclination was to attach the adjective "overriding" or "absolute" to these last demands, only to recognize that total assurance is impossible if passengers board airplanes at all, and, even more so-if one can conceive of gradations of "impossibility"-if they travel by car instead.)
Apart from recognizing that there is a problem here, having little or nothing to do with economic merits of deregulation, I have no particular wisdom to impart about the proper distribution of burdens of these failures between carriers and travelers-a problem which Congress has been grappling with unsuccessfully for at least the past decade. The possible encounter of weather unfit for flying is obviously an inherent part of the bundle of services covered by purchasing a confirmed reservation: so long as the certification of that contingency is by an objective third-party, that is a cost that air travelers and carriers already assume-with no apparent reason for government regulation to change its distribution between them.
In contrast, the costs to flyers of flight cancellations for mechanical reasons or lack of sufficient in-flight staff-or simple economy-would seem clearly the responsibility of the airlines themselves, and an equitable consumer protection program would presumably call for full compensation (however measured) to purchasers of tickets-which would also give the carriers the proper incentive to maintain the optimal balance between the costs of maintaining spare equipment and personnel sufficient to avoid such cancellations and the likely costs to them and to passengers of cancellations attributable to insufficient spare capacity.
Energy policy
After their-one would hope-embarrassing support for quotas on Japanese cars, the other early premonitory defection of 20 th century "liberals", first informally, then openly in Senator Kennedy's campaign in 1980 for the Democratic presidential nomination, was over the issue of retention or abandonment of the price controls on crude oil and gasoline-previously imposed under the terms of the oil import quota system enacted in 1959. In my role as administrator of the President's ill-fated wage and price standards, I was visited by representatives of many of the consumer organizations that had previously supported our airline and trucking deregulations, in which Ralph Nader warned me that if President Carter removed those ceilings they would withdraw their support from the entire anti-inflation program.
Recognizing that those controls, holding the domestic price of crude oil far below world levels, represented terrible energy policy, the President proceeded to set a schedule for deregulationanother exhibition of courageous adherence to principle for which he never received the credit he deserved. Even bolder was his subsequent invocation of his authority under that same Import
Control Act to impose a ten-cents-a-gallon tax on gasoline-again, impeccable energy policywhich promised the additional benefit of raising the $10 billion a year we needed to bring in a balanced budget for the next fiscal year. Although the President urgently invited the members of the House and Senate to blame him, while letting the tax stand, Congress proceeded promptly to rescind it.
IV. "Network Neutrality"-The Unseemly Rush to Regulate
And 
W. S. Gilbert, Iolanthe
One of the most important current regulatory issues in which not only "Progressives" but also, alas, most of my fellow liberals seem to be on the regulatory or re-regulatory side, revolves around proposed legislation to require providers of high-speed Internet access to practice "network neutrality"-a movement set off by a deregulatory-minded FCC's disclaimer of mandatory jurisdiction.
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From the "commons"-no charge-to no "discriminatory" charge
The concept of network neutrality evidently evolved out of a romantic (the characterization is descriptive, not derisive) vision of the Internet as a "commons," open to all offerers of programs and content, free of charge, with guaranteed immediate access of any one broadband service subscriber to all others. This vision has, anomalously, led some professed consumer activists to make the astounding proposal that the only charges be to the subscribersthe ultimate consumers: that originators or suppliers of Internet programs, content or service not be subject to additional charge at all for access to them 39 . That contention-obviously self- . Sometimes one wonders who is supporting these several "consumer activists"! interested on the part of such prominent suppliers of content and service as Google-ignores the fact that access to subscribers-the ultimate customers-is not only costly to provide (consider, for example, the multi-billion dollar investments of the telephone companies extending fiber to the premises, which will enable them to offer video in direct competition with the hitherto franchised-monopoly cable companies; and the similar huge investments in wireless 40 ) but independently valuable to the content suppliers themselves as a potential source of advertising and other revenue:
Google has become a powerhouse in advertising largely by selling short text advertising closely associated with topics people are researching or reading about on the Web. But it is increasingly looking to place more elaborate advertisements that are more attractive to marketers promoting product brands. Last year, it started allowing advertisers to bid to place advertisements using graphics and animation on sites it represents.
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It is just as misguided for consumer advocates to want to forbid the telephone and cable companies that carry those messages charging advertisers for access to the public as it would be to impose a similar prohibition on newspapers, television broadcasters or cable companies, requiring them to obtain their revenues exclusively from readers, purchasers, subscribers or viewers: think instead, for example, of who pays now for the annual broadcasts of Super Bowl games! It has made good economic sense, therefore, and been beneficial to both content suppliers and receivers to have had both of them together bear the heavy and continuously growing costs of connecting them: the goal of an open, free "commons" has therefore given way to a demand that Internet access providers be required only to practice "network neutrality".
It has not always been clear exactly what the supporters of that obligation have wanted.
In general, their objection has been to the telephone and cable companies either charging at all, or "discriminating" in their charges among suppliers of content or programs and/or, specifically, "discriminating" on the basis of guaranteed priority in speed of delivery. Such a practice, they 40 Marguerite Reardon, "Citywide Wi-Fi spending could hit $3 billion," CNET News.com (October 25, 2006) , available at http://m.news.com/Citywide+Wi-Fi+spending+could+hit+3+billion/2163-7351_3-6129655.html. Additionally, Sprint/Nextel announced a year or so ago that, in partnership with Intel, it would be spending $3 billion in the next two to three years extending mobile Wi-Max service nationwide. express the fear, would be to the advantage of "deep-pocketed corporations" (whenever I hear that metaphor, I immediately reach for my own pocket, to make sure it is tightly buttoned) leaving all other content providers (the "little guys") to "the digital equivalent of a winding dirt road" 42 -a fair example of the populist rhetoric of leading advocates.
The concern, however demagogically put, is not ridiculous. The Internet is obviously something revolutionary, and there is room for something less than full confidence in the adequacy of competitive exploitation of its full potential under what is still essentially a telephone and cable company duopoly. The disagreement is in important measure therefore over the sufficiency of wireless access as a third option, particularly as the FCC opens more of the spectrum for that use, limiting the market power of the two dominating ubiquitous incumbent terrestrial systems. To be sure, there are already many, many more subscribers now to wireless or cellular than to traditional land-line telephone service-subscriptions to the latter have dropped by 11 percent in just the last six years: phone books are becoming palpably thinner.
But while broadband wireless is likewise growing rapidly, to the point that it (including satellite) As to the aforementioned "arguably contradictory" contention, it seems to me that the justification Professor Frieden gives for imposing or retaining net neutrality requirements on the terrestrial carriers-namely, the The revolutionary, inherently competitive potential of telecommunications technology, however, and the large, risky investments required to exploit it, argue strongly against subjecting Internet access to the thoroughgoing regulation traditionally applied to common carriers. 46 Moreover, the blanket objection to "discrimination" among suppliers of programming or content on the basis of a guaranteed priority in speed of delivery is ignorant. To an economist-and, one would hope, in ordinary parlance as well-"discrimination" is confined to differences in price, whether for the same service or for different services, that are not justified by differences in the cost of supplying them. Manifestly, however, preferential guaranteed speed of delivery for particular messages can, when the network is congested, entail a delay, however slight, in the transmission of non-priority services: that is a real cost. And, in the longer-run, it involves the cost of providing additional broadband capacity sufficient to minimize-strictly "optimize"-that negative effect.
Differences in charges reflecting such differences in the cost of providing different qualities of service are the consequence not of monopoly but of an effectively functioning market. The notion that it is "discriminatory" to charge users for services-such as voice telephone (VoIP), virtual teleconferencing, on-line gaming or downloading movies, the last a frighteningly growing demand-that use more bandwidth than others, for the guaranteed priority in delivery that they require for intelligibility or the additional investment that they invoke is ignorant.
47 So is the failure to recognize also the legitimacy of genuine price discrimination as a asserted spottiness and insufficiency of their wireless competition-conflicts with his later proposal to impose on the wireless challengers the same obligation to permit attachment of "alien" devices or terminal equipment at the subscriber's end as the 1968 Carterfone precedent applied to the local AT&T franchised monopolies. See my discussion of the "alien attachments" issue in The Economics of Regulation, Vol. 2, pages 140-145. For a convincing marshalling of the evidence, however, that the rapid expansion of wireless and cable telephony as well as the effect of heavy sunk costs on the level of profit-maximizing prices (in an argument anticipated by J.M. Clark's distinction between prices and "margin" elasticity of demand 47 years ago in his Competition as a Dynamic Process, Washington: Brookings, 1961, pp. 149-150 , justifies deregulation of retail prices, see Timothy J. Tardiff, "Changes in industry structure and technological convergence: implications for competition policy and regulation in telecommunications", International Economics and Economic Policy, 4:2, 2007, pp. 109-133. 45 See the thoroughly nuanced factual assessment by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, broadband connectivity competition policy June 2007, Chapter VI, culminating in "Suggested Guiding Principles" fully consonant with the policy conclusions I offer here. For a clear recognition of this by the more sophisticated advocates of network neutrality, see, among others, Frieden, op. cit., note 37 above. For an incisive explication of the simple economic corollary that interference means of recovering the heavy fixed and common costs of providing telecommunications services to a multiplicity of markets, provided it is not anti-competitive.
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The proper agencies for administering that last proviso-which I intend emphatically to be the opposite of perfunctory-are the FCC and antitrust agencies, acting as enforcers of the antitrust laws and not as traditional regulatory agencies-prescribing rates and allowable rates of return overall: that is my liberal conception of the lessons of history-lessons I spell out in greater detail and with greater emphasis in section V, following.
In these circumstances, the remedy proposed by the network neutrality advocates is likely to be counter-productive.
The There can be no doubt that the Congress felt that the ultimate beneficiary . . . was the consumer…. The immediate beneficiary legislators had in mind, however, was in all probability the small business … whose opportunities were to be safeguarded from the dangers emanating from those recently-evolving elements of business…. strange, gigantic, ruthless and awe-inspiring. This is one reason why it was natural to adopt the old doctrines of the common law, doctrines whose meaning had been established largely in cases brought by business or professional people dissatisfied with the behavior of competitors.
Perhaps we are even justified in saying that the Sherman Act is not to be viewed exclusively as an expression of economic policy. In safeguarding rights of the 'common man' in business 'equal' to those of the evolving more 'ruthless' . . . the Sherman Act embodies what is to be characterized as an eminently 'social' purpose. Session, explicitly recommending application of the Section 5 FTC Act unfair methods of competition "model"-which accords completely with my own historical position. The DACA proposal goes on, however, to recommend that the prohibition of discrimination or other practices denying rivals a fair opportunity to compete apply only to practices or behavior that demonstrably "pose a substantial and non-transitory risk to consumer welfare"-a clear victory for the University of Chicago, but also representing a consensus view of most respectable economists as well as the courts.
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My own historical position-that antitrust proscriptions of unfair methods of competition should apply to all genuine discriminations by franchised wireline and wireless telephone and cable companies in favor of affiliated content providers, to the disadvantage of unaffiliated ones-is the main olive branch I offer to advocates of network neutrality legislation.
To return to the present flood of highly emotional demands on Congress to enact such a requirement, by all means let there be congressional hearings, and administrative agencies explicitly instructed to subject claims of "discrimination" to critical scrutiny. There is nothing liberal or progressive, however, about the government rushing in to regulate the wonderfully promising, turbulent, technology-based competitive developments in telecommunications.
Whatever the professed disillusionment of "progressives" with the results of the economic principles-unless and until an objective, non-ideological review of experience demonstrates their inadequacy to ensure fair and efficient competitive exploitation of the Internet miracle.
The Verizon blunder: does it demonstrate the need for network neutrality legislation?
In late September of 2007, in a master-stroke of ineptitude, Verizon Wireless unwittingly performed the major public service of forcing liberal opponents of legislatively-mandated network neutrality, such as I, to look to the internal consistency of our several views, byinitially-refusing to make its mobile network available for a text-message proffered by the National Abortion Rights League. The responsible employee did so, he said, in accordance with the Company's asserted policy against distributing content that "may be seen as controversial or unsavory to any of our users" 59 The refusal, almost immediately reversed by a wiser higher management, 60 brought down a storm of protest and widespread assertions that this was exactly the kind of practice that statutorily mandated network neutrality would be intended to prevent.
Perhaps significantly, the New York Times did not relate its condemnation of the initial Verizon action specifically to its long-time advocacy of such legislation, condemning it instead simply as a case of "textbook censorship" and calling upon the Federal Communications Commission merely to quickly issue regulations that … bar interference with text messaging:
"Freedom of speech must be guaranteed, right now, in a digital world just as it has been protected in a world of paper and ink."
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Those of us with long memories will recall that this was the vision also of the "fairness doctrine"-the obligation of radio and television broadcasters, in exchange for the gift of The perversely named Fairness Doctrine, which threatened licensed broadcasters with fines if they didn't "afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views," as the government defined it, has shown up in the news again recently, as federal lawmakers and liberal media activists have called for increased regulation of a media marketplace that they feel is spinning out of their control. But the push to reimpose the doctrine-which the Reagan administration abandoned in the late 1980s as obsolete and harmful to free speech-may be mostly a diversionary tactic. The Left has a much bigger target in its regulatory crosshairs: the Internet. Over the past few years, many of the same policymakers and activists who have long trumpeted the Fairness Doctrine have advocated that its rough equivalent apply to Internet service providers. And they've come up with another Orwellian term for the proposal: "net neutrality."
In theory, net-neutrality regulation would ban Internet operators from treating some bits of online traffic or communications more favorably than others, whether for economic or political purposes. Proponents of net neutrality use the same kind of fantastic rhetoric to describe it that they once used for the Fairness Doctrine: it's a way to "save the Internet" from "media barons," they say, who're apparently hell-bent on controlling all our thoughts and activities…..
It's a brilliant tactic by the Left. Why exert all your energy attempting to reimpose "fairness" mandates on broadcasters alone when you can capture them, and much more, by regulating the entire Internet? After all, in a world of media convergence and abundance, bright lines dividing distinct media sectors or their products have vanished. Everything from TV shows to text messages run on multiple networks making the old, broadcast-oriented Fairness Doctrine a less effective means of reestablishing a liberal media monopoly. So the liberals got smart and came up with the perfect solution: use net neutrality as the backdoor way to reimpose the Fairness Doctrine on the entire media marketplace.
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The logic of the fairness doctrine was, however, not the basis of my dismay at the original action by the misguided Verizon executive. It was, instead, its violation of the historic common carriage obligations of franchised communications companies: they have no business examining and interfering with messages transmitted over their facilities.
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Candor requires me to express a layman's skepticism about undiluted application of the First Amendment to artificial "persons". As I lack the ability or the will to have penetrated the thicket of time-varying bundled offerings as a consumer, I have no particular competence to suggest ways in which it might be perfectly consistent with liberalism for a government agency to play such a more active role.
One of the olive branches that a liberal extends to "Progressives" is a solicitation of their collaboration in framing legislative or administrative proposals to this end-although enactment 67 "The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics," Kyklos, Volume 19, 1966. 68 See the concluding section and central recommendation of Hass, note 50, op. cit., in lieu of mandated network neutrality, pp. 56-64, 2007. 
